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Abstract
The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good provision gives all agents the
possibility to condition their contribution on the total level of contribution provided
by all agents. In this experimental study the mechanism's performance is compared
to the performance of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. In an environment
with binary contribution and linear valuations subjects play the mechanisms in a
repeated setting. The mechanisms are compared in one case of complete information
and homogeneous valuations and in a second case with heterogeneous valuations and
incomplete information. In both cases a signiﬁcantly higher contribution rate can be
observed when the Conditional Contribution Mechanism is used.
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Response Dynamics.
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1 Introduction
Numerous attempts have been made to solve the free-rider problem in public good environ-
ments. While there are many complex mechanisms that have good theoretical properties,
it is exactly this complexity that makes them diﬃcult to apply in practical applications.
However, the simple mechanisms which are mostly used, like e.g. the Voluntary Contribu-
tion Mechanism (VCM), do not have good theoretical properties and suﬀer, at least to some
extent, from the free-rider problem. With the recent development of the Binary Conditional
Contribution Mechanism (BCCM) there is a new simple candidate to solve the free-rider
problem (Reischmann, 2015). This paper presents the ﬁrst experimental evidence on the
performance of the BCCM.
This special case of the class of Conditional Contribution Mechanisms (CCMs) is ap-
plicable in binary contribution environments. It extends the message space of the VCM
{"Contribute", "Don't Contribute"} by conditional contribution oﬀers of the form "Con-
tribute only if at least k other agents contribute as well". The mechanism is played simul-
taneously by all agents. When there are multiple outcomes that satisfy all conditions, the
mechanism selects of these outcomes the one with the largest amount of total contributions.
The CCMs are designed with a focus on dynamic properties. Thus, the static equilibrium
properties are not very impressive. The CCMs have many eﬃcient, but also many ineﬃcient
Nash equilibria. However, Reischmann (2015) applies a variant of Better Response Dynamics
under which all outcomes of dynamic steady states are Pareto eﬃcient. Since Healy (2006)
shows that Better Response Dynamics describe subject behavior in public good games rather
well, the BCCM is well suited for repeated public good environments.
The aim of this experimental study is to evaluate whether the BCCM is a suitable candi-
date to solve the free-rider problem. For this sake, I compare the BCCM with the VCM. The
VCM is chosen as a comparison since it is, besides the Provision Point Mechanism (PPM),
the only mechanism that is regularly applied in practical applications. Further the PPM is
better suited for step-level public goods, which are not the focus of this study. Thus, the
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VCM is still the most important benchmark to beat.
Both the VCM and the BCCM are tested in two repeated public good environments, one
with complete and one with incomplete information. In both treatments I ﬁnd the eﬀect,
that the BCCM produces signiﬁcantly higher contribution rates than the VCM. As expected
from the theoretical analysis the diﬀerence in contribution rates is mainly found in the last 10
periods. This result supports the theoretical prediction that the BCCM sets better dynamic
incentives in repeated public good environments than the VCM.
1.1 Related literature
My work mostly relates to two kinds of literature, ﬁrst experiments comparing the perfor-
mance of two or more public good mechanisms and second experimental studies on behavior
in public good mechanisms in general, or the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism in partic-
ular.
Smith (1979, 1980) compares his auction mechanism to the VCM and a quasi-free-rider
mechanism. All three mechanisms have in addition an unanimity rule. If an outcome is
not unanimously accepted no contribution will be made to the public good. Smith ﬁnds
that the auction mechanism supplies signiﬁcantly higher levels of the public good as the
free rider quantity. However, if the cases when unanimity fails are taken into account the
auction mechanism does not perform signiﬁcantly better than the alternative mechanisms.
Banks et al. (1988) continue the investigation of the auction mechanism and compare it to
the VCM. They compare both mechanisms with and without unanimity. They ﬁnd that the
auction mechanism is more eﬃcient than voluntary contribution. Unanimity seems to lower
contributions overall.
There are multiple studies comparing the VCM with a Provision Point Mechanism (PPM).
Rondeau et al. (1999) show that under speciﬁc conditions the PPM can be demand revealing.
Building on this Rondeau et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the PPM leads in a lab and a ﬁeld experiment
to a higher willingness to contribute to the public good than the VCM. Rose et al. (2002)
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further study the PPM in a ﬁeld experiment on green energy and ﬁnd that contribution rates
outperform previous studies that used the VCM. However, every contribution in the VCM
can deﬁnitely be used to ﬁnance a certain level of the public good. Contributions under the
PPM might be lost for the public good if the threshold for provision was chosen too high.
Further mechanisms that have recently been tested experimentally are auction and lottery
mechanisms. Schram and Onderstal (2009) compare a ﬁrst-price winner-pay auction, a ﬁrst-
price all-pay auction and a lottery. They ﬁnd that out of those three mechanisms the all-pay
auction leads to signiﬁcantly higher contributions. Morgan and Sefton (2000) present an
experiment in which a lottery leads to higher contribution to a public good than the VCM.
They further ﬁnd that higher price money leads to a more eﬀective mechanism. Contrary to
the ﬁndings of Schram and Onderstal (2009), Corazzini et al. (2010) show an experiment in
which a lottery outperforms an all-pay auction. Still in their experiment both mechanisms
fare better than the VCM.
Behavior in public good environments under the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism is
very well understood. Early experiments ﬁnd consistently that contribution rates are around
half-way between the eﬃcient and the free-rider quantity in one-shot games. Under repeated
interaction these contributions decline over time. See Ledyard (1994) for a survey on this
branch of the literature. The more recent experiment by Burger and Kolstad (2009) covers
VCM treatments with binary contributions and they ﬁnd results in the same spirit, medium
contribution rates in the ﬁrst period and a decline of contributions over time.
By now economic theory can explain these ﬁndings that contradict the strong free-rider
hypothesis. One explanation is given by social preferences, as e.g. the model of inequality
aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Another explanation are preferences for conditional
cooperation as found by Fischbacher et al. (2001). In combination with the ﬁnding of Healy
(2006) that agents better respond in public good environments this explains positive contri-
butions in the ﬁrst period as well as the decline over time.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the two mechanisms
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that will be covered in the experiment. In section 3, there is a short theoretical analysis
of the equilibrium properties of those mechanisms. Section 4 covers the description of the
experimental setup, while section 5 presents the results. Finally, section 6 gives a short
summary and discussion of the paper. Translations of written instructions and test questions
handed out to subjects in the experiment can be found in the appendix.
2 Environment and mechanisms
In this experimental study I compare two diﬀerent mechanisms. Both mechanisms are tested
in an environment with ﬁve agents. Those agents play one of the mechanisms as a stage game
repeated over 20 periods. In every period the agents are endowed with 10 points.1 Those
points can be invested in a group project or be kept in the private account. The points can
not be divided between the two options, so contribution is binary. In the following section
an outcome is going to be described by z = (z1, z2, z3, z4, z5). zi = 0 denotes that agent i
does not invest his points into the project and zi = 10 implies that he does invest his points
into the project.
The two mechanisms are compared in two diﬀerent cases. One case with complete infor-
mation and homogeneous valuations and one with incomplete information and heterogeneous
valuations. Comparisons between the two cases with the same mechanism are not the focus
of this study.
In the complete information case every agent knows all players' valuations for the public
good and valuations are homogeneous with θi = 0.6. In the incomplete information case
agents only know their own valuation and all agents have a valuation of θi = 0 with a
probability of 20% and a valuation of θi = 0.6 with probability of 80%. Thus, heterogeneous
valuations are possible. The ﬁrst type of agents, who do not beneﬁt from the public good,
are called type 1 agents. And agents, who do beneﬁt, are called type 2 agents. The draws
110 points are chosen to ensure that the number of points earned in each period is a natural number in
all cases.
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of valuations for group members are independent. Every draw is used though for one group
with each mechanism to ensure comparability. Given their valuation agents have the following
payoﬀ function:
Πi = 10− zi + θi
5∑
j=1
zj (1)
In the Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism (BCCM) agents can condition their
contribution on a total level of contribution provided by all agents. The message space is
given by Mi = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Message mi = k can be interpreted as saying "I'm willing to
contribute to the public good if at least k other agents contribute as well." Message mi = 0 is
equivalent to contributing in any case. And the message mi = 5 is equivalent to contributing
in no case.2 An oﬀer for conditional contribution can be satisﬁed it two ways. Either the
agent does not have to contribute. Or his condition for contribution is satisﬁed. This implies
that for a given message proﬁle m there might be more than one outcome z that satisﬁes
all conditional contribution oﬀers. Of all those outcomes the BCCM selects the one with
the highest total level of contribution. This can be formalized by using the following help
variable:
K(m) := max
{
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}
∣∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
1(mi<k) ≥ k
}
, (2)
where 1(mi<k) denotes the indicator function, which is 1 if mi < k and 0 otherwise. With
this variable, the outcome of the mechanism can be deﬁned as gBCCM(m) = z with zi = 10
if and only if mi < K(m).
Example 2.1 Consider the following examples. If all agents choose mi = 5, no agent con-
tributes to the public good. If all agents choose mi = 4, there are two outcomes that satisfy
all conditions. In the outcome z = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10) all agents contribute to the public good.
And in the outcome z = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) no agent contributes to the public good. Therefore,
2Since there are only 5 agents in total, there can never be more than four other contributing agents.
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the BCCM selects the ﬁrst outcome and all agents will have to contribute. Similarly if e.g.
m1 = m2 = m3 = 2, m4 = 4, m5 = 5, then agents 1, 2 and 3 will contribute to the public
good.
The mechanism that I use as a benchmark is a standard binary Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism (VCM). In this mechanism agents have only two options. They can contribute
in any case or free-ride in any case.
3 Theoretical predictions
For an extensive analysis of the theoretical predictions of the general Conditional Contribu-
tion Mechanisms I refer to the companion paper (Reischmann, 2015). Here I analyze the
predictions for the speciﬁc versions of the mechanisms used in the experiments.
Two diﬀerent solution concepts will be considered. The ﬁrst one is Nash equilibrium,
since it is the most standard concept and it provides intuition about what might be stable
outcomes of the mechanisms. The second one is Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics.
This is a variant of Better Response Dynamics which is developed and motivated in the
companion paper mentioned above.3 The deﬁnition is as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1 Given a message proﬁle m and an outcome g(m) = z, a deviation from mi
to m′i is called exploitable if there exists m−i ∈ M−i such that z′(m−i) := g(m′i,m−i) ≺i
z and z′i(m−i) > 0. A message m
′
i is called unexploitable, if it is not exploitable.
Deﬁnition 3.2 In Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics (UBRD) all agents can adjust
their message in every period. Agent i switches in period t to message mti with strictly positive
probability if and only if
• mti is a (weak) better response to mt−1 and
3UBRD is only supposed to capture all relevant long term incentives of the Conditional Contribution
Mechanisms. Thus, the concept wants to make a good prediction about what outcomes occur in dynamically
stable states of the CCM. The concept is not intended to describe agents short term behavior in detail. Nor
is it intended to be applicable to other mechanisms.
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• mti is unexploitable with respect to zt−1 := g(mt−1).
Summarizing the motivation given in Reischmann (2015), UBRD makes the following two
assumptions on long term incentives. First, in the long term agents do not choose messages
that make them worse oﬀ immediately. This is captured by the better response condition.
Second, agents do not choose messages that make outcomes possible, in which the agent
has to contribute to the public good, but is worse oﬀ than in the current outcome. This is
captured by the unexploitability condition.
Since this is an experimental study, the experimental results will present a good oppor-
tunity to evaluate the validity of this concept. Thus, the discussion whether UBRD is a
reasonable solution concept for this mechanism is postponed to section 5, where the experi-
mental results are discussed.
3.1 Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism gives every agent the choice whether he wants to
contribute to the public good. And no agent has any inﬂuence over any other agent's con-
tribution. Disregarding social preferences, it is easy to see, and well known in the literature,
that free-riding is a dominant strategy here. This is true for all agents with a valuation
θi < 1. The straight forward Nash prediction, not taking possible social preferences into
account, is thus that all agents will free-ride. Since free-riding is a strictly dominant strat-
egy any reﬁnement of Better Response Dynamics will also predict this outcome as a unique
steady state.
However, it is equally well known that this theoretical prediction is seldom to never
observed in experiments. Indeed the general observation is a contribution rate of about 40-
60% of the eﬃcient level in the ﬁrst period. If the public good game is played repeatedly, as it
is in this study, the typical experimental ﬁnding is that contribution rates decline over time.
Social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) as well as preferences for conditional cooperation
(Fischbacher et al., 2001) in combination with a better responding behavior (Healy, 2006)
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explain these ﬁndings well. Since those ﬁndings are very persistent (see Ledyard (1994) for
a survey of the early ﬁndings and Burger and Kolstad (2009) for a recent example with the
binary VCM), this is also what I expect to ﬁnd in this experiment.
3.2 Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism
Reischmann (2015) proves that any outcome of the BCCM is the outcome of a Nash equilib-
rium if and only if it is a weak Pareto improvement over z := (0, 0, 0, 0, 0). This is easy to see
for the speciﬁc case considered in the experiment. Consider the outcome z = (10, 10, 10, 0, 0)
in the complete information treatment (θi = 0.6 ∀ i = 1, . . . , 5). This is a Pareto improve-
ment over z. One Nash equilibrium that leads to this outcome is given bym1 = m2 = m3 = 2,
m4 = m5 = 5. All other Pareto improvements z over z are supported as Nash equilibrium in
similar fashion. Agents who contribute in z condition their contribution on the total level of
contribution in z and all other agents choose to contribute in no case.
Thus, the Nash prediction in the homogeneous case would be that either none, two, three,
four, or all ﬁve subjects contribute in any group. This, of course, is no useful prediction since
it only excludes outcomes in which one subject contributes alone. Unexploitable Better
Response Dynamics, however, predict convergence to either an outcome in which all ﬁve
subjects contribute (m = (4, 4, 4, 4, 4)), or an outcome in which four agents contribute (m =
(3, 3, 3, 3, 5), in any permutation). Note that these are exactly the outcomes which are Pareto
eﬃcient in a non-transferable utility framework.
The formal proof that the stable outcomes of the BCCM under UBRD coincide with the
Pareto eﬃcient allocations, which are Pareto improvements over z, can again be found in the
companion paper. Here I provide some intuition with another example.
Example 3.3 Assume that the current message proﬁle is m = (3, 3, 3, 3, 5). In this case only
agent 5 does not contribute to the public good. Thus, the outcome is z = (10, 10, 10, 10, 0).
Any deviation of agent 5 will lead to an outcome in which he has to contribute to the public
good. This would not be a better response. If any one of agents 1 through 4 switches to a
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message mi ∈ {4, 5} the outcome would be z. Those messages are not better responses either.
Any message mi ∈ {0, 1, 2} violates the unexploitability condition since it makes outcomes
possible in which the agent must contribute but is worse oﬀ than in the current outcome.
Take e.g. m1 = 2. This makes the message proﬁle m = (2, 2, 2, 5, 5) possible. In this proﬁle
agent 1 has to contribute and total contributions are lower than in the other outcome. Thus,
the message proﬁle m = (3, 3, 3, 3, 5) is one steady state of UBRD.
The next example demonstrates why outcomes that are not Pareto eﬃcient can not be
steady states of UBRD.
Example 3.4 Assume that the current message proﬁle is m = (2, 2, 2, 5, 5). In this case
agents 1,2 and 3 contribute to the public good. Thus, the outcome is z = (10, 10, 10, 0, 0).
No agent can directly beneﬁt from any deviation. Thus, the message proﬁle m is a Nash
equilibrium. However, agents 4 and 5 can deviate to the message mi = 4. One such devia-
tion does not change the outcome and a unilateral deviation is thus a weak better response.
Further, agents 4 and 5 will only have to contribute to the public good if the outcome will be
z′ = (10, 10, 10, 10, 10). Agents 4 and 5 are both better oﬀ in z′ than in z. Thus, the message
mi = 4 is unexploitable. However, if both agents 4 and 5 switch to mi = 4 the outcome will
indeed be z′. Therefore, m is not a steady state of UBRD.
The equilibria in the incomplete information treatment mirror the results of the complete
information case. Since the dynamics only consider the heterogeneity part of the incomplete
information treatment this is not surprising. Thus, in this treatment either all or all but
one type 2 agents are predicted to contribute. Still, all outcomes of steady states are Pareto
eﬃcient.
4 Experimental design
The experiments were conducted at the Alfred-Weber Institute of Heidelberg University.
The subject pool used for recruiting consists mainly of students. In each session 10, 15 or
10
20 subjects participated in groups of 5. In total 195 subjects took part in the experiments.
Seven groups played the VCM with complete information and eight groups played the BCCM
with complete information. In the incomplete information treatment each mechanism was
played by 12 groups. Sessions lasted between 45 minutes and one hour.
When the subjects entered the lab they were randomly allocated to their seats by drawing
numbered cards. Every subject was then handed one set of instructions and test questions.
English translations of the instructions and test questions can be found in Appendix A and
B. Once all subjects answered the test questions correctly and there were no more questions a
computer program written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) was started. The program randomly
matched subjects in groups of 5. Groups stayed the same over all 20 periods. Every group
played only one mechanism and only one information treatment. In the incomplete informa-
tion treatment the random draw of types was performed by the program at the beginning of
period one.
After the last period there was a short questionnaire asking for personal characteristics
such as gender and previous knowledge of game theory. Afterwards subjects were called by
seat number to receive their payoﬀ in private. In every period subjects could earn between
6 and 30 points. Points of all periods were added up. Subjects were payed 1¤ for every 40
points. Type 1 subjects in the incomplete information treatment received an additional 5¤
to compensate them for the lower earning possibilities. Average earnings per subject were
11.55¤.
5 Experimental results
This study intends to answer two questions. First, is the BCCM suited to improve contribu-
tion rates to public goods compared to the VCM? Second, is the model of UBRD suited to
predict long term stable outcomes of Conditional Contribution Mechanisms?
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5.1 Contribution rates
Whether or not the BCCM can increase contributions to the public good signiﬁcantly com-
pared to the VCM is the primary question. Therefore, I compare total contributions in
groups under the BCCM to those contributions under the VCM using the Wilcoxon-Rank-
Sum Test. In each group I take the average of total contributions over a certain number of
periods. First, I consider all periods to get an impression of the total eﬀect. Second, I only
consider the last 10 periods, to get an impression of the long term eﬀect, once a certain level
of convergence has taken place including the endgame eﬀect. Third, I consider periods 9 to
18. This choice makes it possible to look at the long term eﬀects excluding the end game
eﬀect.
Figure 1: Comparison of average contributions over all groups in the complete informa-
tion treatment.
Average contributions per period over all groups with complete information are displayed
in ﬁgure 1. The ﬁgure makes the following immediate observations possible. First, the
contribution rate in the ﬁrst period under the VCM is surprisingly high. The reason for
this is probably the binary contribution environment in combination with the rather small
group size of 5. Second, contributions in the VCM decline over time as expected. Third,
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Figure 2: Comparison of average contributions over all groups in the incomplete infor-
mation treatment.
contribution rates in the BCCM are similar to the VCM in early periods but much higher in
the later periods. Fourth, the BCCM does, in this treatment, not suﬀer from any endgame
eﬀect. All these observations support the theoretical prediction that the BCCM has better
dynamic properties than the VCM. In fact the BCCM leads already to signiﬁcantly higher
contributions when all periods are taken into account (p = 0.0425). When only the last 10
periods are considered the eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant (p = 0.0080). And when I exclude the
endgame eﬀect (periods 9 to 18) the results are still signiﬁcant (p = 0.0388).
In the incomplete information treatment type 1 agents have a dominant strategy to free-
ride. Besides a few mistakes in period 1 and one mistake in period 2 all subjects also chose
this strategy. Therefore, contribution rates in the incomplete information treatments are
always compared in terms of average contributions of type 2 agents. Average contributions of
type 2 agents per period over all groups with incomplete information are displayed in ﬁgure
2. The observations from this ﬁgure diﬀer from the complete information case in only one
way. Under incomplete information the BCCM suﬀers from a severe endgame eﬀect. There
are two reasons for this. Some agents harm themselves by deviating because they try to
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Figure 3: Comparison of average contributions over all groups with at least one type 1
agent.
free-ride in a coordinated equilibrium resulting in a complete breakdown of contributions.
My only explanation for this behavior is that some agents make mistakes, because of the
somewhat higher complexity of the incomplete information treatment. The second reason is
that some groups reach Pareto eﬃcient outcomes, but no stable equilibrium by period 20.
This creates incentives for individual agents to deviate. However, more than one deviation
usually leads again to a complete breakdown. This makes the endgame eﬀect even bigger
than in the VCM treatments. This second eﬀect might vanish when more periods are played,
which gives subjects more time to converge to stable equilibria. Besides this point, however,
the results are very similar. The increase in contributions when all periods are considered is
at least weakly signiﬁcant (p = 0.0602). For the last 10 periods results are again signiﬁcant
at the 1% level with a p-value of p = 0.0078. And when the last two periods are excluded
the increase is signiﬁcant at the 5% level (p = 0.0199).
Figure 3 shows the average contribution rates when in the incomplete information treat-
ments only those groups are considered that contain at least one type 1 agent. This leads to
lower contribution rates under both mechanisms in the ﬁrst half of the experiment. However,
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groups playing the BCCM manage to achieve the same high contribution rates in periods
10 to 19. Groups playing the VCM however can not stop the decline of contributions. This
observation strengthens the impression that the BCCM robustly reaches high long term con-
tribution rates even in settings in which coordination in the early periods is diﬃcult.
Result 5.1 Under complete as well as under incomplete information the Binary Conditional
Contribution Mechanism leads to higher contribution rates than the Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism.
The theoretical analysis further suggests that the BCCM should be able to reach stable
equilibria with high contribution levels. If this is true it should not be possible to ﬁnd a
decrease in contributions over time as has repeatedly been shown for the VCM. In fact since
failed coordination in the early periods might lead to low contribution rates in those periods
the BCCM might lead to an increase of contributions over time. Therefore a Wilcoxon
Matched-Pairs Signed Rank Test is used to compare average contribution rates over the ﬁrst
10 periods with those over the last 10 periods.
In both treatments with the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism contributions in the ﬁrst
10 periods are signiﬁcantly higher than in the last 10 periods. The p-values are given by
p = 0.0343 for complete information and p = 0.0022 for incomplete information.
In the BCCM treatments on the other hand I observe higher contribution rates in the last
10 than in the ﬁrst 10 periods under complete information with a p-value of p = 0.0193. And
under incomplete information the hypothesis that contribution rates in the ﬁrst and last 10
periods are equal can not be rejected (p = 0.3668).
Result 5.2 In treatments with the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism contributions decrease
over time. In treatments with the Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism this is not
the case. Under complete information contribution rates are even increasing.
One typical goal of the implementation problem is that the designed mechanism should
lead to Pareto eﬃcient outcomes. Whether the BCCM leads to Pareto eﬃcient outcomes
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can only be answered qualitatively. In the case of complete information when all periods are
considered 91.88% of outcomes are Pareto eﬃcient. When only the last 10 periods are taken
into account 96.25% of outcomes are eﬃcient. And in the last 4 periods every single outcome
is Pareto eﬃcient. Note again that Pareto eﬃciency is considered without the possibility of
transfer payments. Thus, an outcome is Pareto eﬃcient if four or ﬁve agents contribute to
the public good.
While the theoretical prediction of Pareto eﬃcient outcomes ﬁts the data well in the
complete information case the situation diﬀers under incomplete information. In those treat-
ments 75.42% of all outcomes under the BCCM are Pareto eﬃcient. This number increases
slightly to 80.83% in the last 10 periods, but decreses again to 75% in the last 4 periods,
because of the endgame eﬀect under incomplete information.
Result 5.3 Under complete information the Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism
converges to Pareto eﬃcient outcomes. Under incomplete information about 3 out of 4 out-
comes are Pareto eﬃcient.
5.2 Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics
Finally, I am interested in the model of Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics itself. How
well does the model ﬁt the data for the Binary Conditional Contribution Mechanism?
Note ﬁrst that the model of better responding agents ﬁts the data pretty well. In the
complete information treatment about 93% of messages sent are better responses. In the
incomplete information treatment the value is even a little bit higher at 96%, both times
high enough to claim that a better responding behavior describes the observations reasonably
well. However, only around half of all messages are also unexploitable better responses in
the two treatments (41% under complete and 53% under incomplete information).
There is no support for a theory that agents learn to choose unexploitable messages over
time under incomplete information (52% of messages are unexploitable better responses in
the last ten and 53% in the last 5 periods). And only weak support for a learning towards
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unexploitablity under complete information (35% in the last ten and 47% in the last 5
periods).
However, Unexploitable Better Response Dynamics is only intended as a concept that
predicts long term stable outcomes. As such UBRD predicts that the long term stable
outcomes are the Pareto eﬃcient outcomes. If the dynamics are considered to have converged
to a stable outcome if at least four out of the last ﬁve outcomes are identical then, 14 out
of 20 groups converge to an outcome. Of those 14 outcomes all 14 are Pareto eﬃcient. This
supports the conclusion that UBRD predicts the dynamically stable outcomes of the BCCM
correctly. In comparison, under the deﬁnition of convergence from above, 8 out of 19 groups
under the VCM reach a stable outcome. Of those 8 outcomes 4 are Pareto eﬃcient and 4 are
not Pareto eﬃcient.
6 Summary and discussion
In this work an experiment was conducted with the aim to test the performance of the Binary
Conditional Contribution Mechanism (BCCM) for public good provision. Since this is the
ﬁrst test a simple binary contribution environment with linear valuations is chosen. In the
experiment the BCCM is compared to the standard Voluntary Contribution Mechanism in
one setting with complete and one with incomplete information.
In all settings the BCCM leads to signiﬁcantly higher contribution rates than the VCM.
This eﬀect is especially large if only the second half of the experiment is considered. In those
periods convergence in many groups of the BCCM is complete and average contribution
rates are rather stable at 93% (complete information) or 81% (incomplete information).
By comparison, average contribution rates over the same periods under the VCM are 60%
(complete information) and 53% (incomplete information). Another important diﬀerence
between the mechanisms is that in groups playing the BCCM no decline of contributions
over time can be observed.
17
This experiment further gives support for the dynamic model Unexploitable Better Re-
sponse Dynamics designed in Reischmann (2015). The model gives an accurate prediction of
the long term stable outcomes of the BCCM in the test environment. And all those outcomes
are Pareto eﬃcient.
With the apparent experimental success of the BCCM the non-binary Conditional Contri-
bution Mechanism should be tested soon in a follow-up experiment. Thus, next tests should
focus on non-binary and/or non-linear environments. Considering the intuitive appeal and
simplicity of the message space the Conditional Contribution Mechanisms are further suited
to be tested in ﬁeld experiments.
The BCCM is a new mechanism for public good provision that satisﬁes individual ratio-
nality and incentive compatibility. Furthermore, the mechanism is, compared to many other
existing mechanisms, rather simple. With the success of the BCCM in this experimental
study it becomes a candidate to ﬁnally solve the free-rider problem in a ﬁtting class of public
good environments.
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Appendix A
This Appendix covers the experiment instructions. They are translations from the German
original. The German version can be obtained on request from the author. The diﬀerent
instructions for the four treatments are given in the following order: 1.) VCM, complete
information, 2.) CCM, complete information, 3.) VCM, incomplete information 4.) CCM,
incomplete information.
6.1 Instructions for VCM with complete information
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned oﬀ until the
experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 20
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or what
payoﬀ any other player obtains.
Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 10 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added entirely to your private account,
or will be invested entirely into a common project. For every player who invests his 10
points into the project all players obtain 6 points.
Example 1: You invest you 10 points into the project and 2 other players invested into
the project additionally. You will get for your investment and for the investment of the other
2 players 6 points each. Thus you will get 3× 6 = 18 points in total added to your account.
Example 2: You do not invest your 10 points into the project and 2 players invested into
the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and get additionally 6 points each for the
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investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get 10 + 2×6 = 22 points in total added to your
account.
Every player can choose in every period between two actions:
• You can invest your 10 points into the project.
• Or you can keep your 10 points for yourself.
All players decide simultaneously.
Payoﬀ of all periods
After it was determined who contributes to the project in a given period, all players get
the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 20 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings for all
periods at a rate of 40 points=1¤. The payment will be private and in cash.
Program structure
You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test actions for you
and the four other players. Once you select an action for every player the computer will
calculate the payoﬀ you would obtain in this case.
In the upper right block you enter the action that will be relevant for your payoﬀ. Below
there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your decision and leave the
screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment continues. A clock on the
upper right hints at the time in which your decision should be made. If the time runs out
this has no eﬀect.
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From period two on the actions of all players of all previous periods and your payoﬀ in
those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the ﬁrst period this block will be
empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
6.2 Instructions for CCM with complete information
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned oﬀ until the
experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 20
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or what
payoﬀ any other player obtains.
Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 10 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added entirely to your private account,
or will be invested entirely into a common project. For every player who invests his 10
points into the project all players obtain 6 points.
Example 1: You invest you 10 points into the project and 2 other players invested into
the project additionally. You will get for your investment and for the investment of the other
2 players 6 points each. Thus you will get 3× 6 = 18 points in total added to your account.
Example 2: You do not invest your 10 points into the project and 2 players invested into
the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and get additionally 6 points each for the
investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get 10 + 2×6 = 22 points in total added to your
account.
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Every player can choose in every period between six diﬀerent conditions:
• 0=Contribute in any case.
• 1=Contribute only if at least one other player contributes, too.
• 2=Contribute only if at least two other players contribute, too.
• 3=Contribute only if at least three other players contribute, too.
• 4=Contribute only if all four other players contribute, too.
• 5=Contribute in no case.
The computer selects the highest amount of players, which can contribute to the project,
without violation the condition of any player. These players will then automatically con-
tribute to the project. The other players will not contribute.
Example 1: 3 players choose condition "1" and the other two players choose condition
"5". Then those 3 players, who chose condition "1" will contribute to the project.
Example 2: 3 players choose condition "3" and the other two players choose condition
"5". Then no player will contribute to the project.
Payoﬀ of all periods
After it was determined who contributes to the project in a given period, all players get
the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 20 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings for all
periods at a rate of 40 points=1¤. The payment will be private and in cash.
Program structure
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You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test conditions for
you and the four other players. Once you select a condition for every player the computer
will calculate the payoﬀ you would obtain in this case.
In the upper right block you enter the condition that will be relevant for your payoﬀ.
Below there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your decision and leave
the screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment continues. A clock on
the upper right hints at the time in which your decision should be made. If the time runs
out this has no eﬀect.
From period two on the conditions of all players of all previous periods and your payoﬀ
in those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the ﬁrst period this block will
be empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
6.3 Instructions for VCM with incomplete information
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned oﬀ until the
experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 20
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or what
payoﬀ any other player obtains.
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Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 10 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added entirely to your private account,
or will be invested entirely into a common project.
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period every player will be assigned one type, which he will
keep for the entire game.
With a chance of 20% you are type 1 and you do not beneﬁt from the common project.
In this case in each period your 10 points will be added to your private account if you do
not invest them into the project. And 0 points will be added to your private account if you
invest into the project. If any other players invest into the project does not inﬂuence your
payoﬀ in this case.
With a chance of 80% you are type 2 and you beneﬁt from the common project. In this
case in each period your 10 points will be added to your private account as well if you do not
invest them into the project, but 6 points will be added to your private account if you invest
into the project. Additionally you receive 6 points for every other player, who also invests
into the project.
The types are drawn independently, especially diﬀerent players may thus have diﬀerent
types. Every player gets displayed his type in every period. He does not get to know the
types of the other players.
Example 1: You are type 2 and you invest you 10 points into the project and 2 other
players invested into the project additionally. You will get for your investment and for the
investment of the other 2 players 6 points each. Thus you will get 3× 6 = 18 points in total
added to your account.
Example 2: You are type 2 and you do not invest your 10 points into the project and 2
players invested into the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and get additionally
6 points each for the investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get 10 + 2× 6 = 22 points
in total added to your account.
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Example 3: You are type 1 and you do not invest your 10 points into the project and 2
players invested into the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and get no additional
points for the investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get 10 points in total added to
your account.
Every player can choose in every period between two actions:
• You can invest your 10 points into the project.
• Or you can keep your 10 points for yourself.
All players decide simultaneously.
Payoﬀ of all periods
After it was determined who contributes to the project in a given period, all players get
the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 20 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings for all
periods at a rate of 40 points=1¤. The payment will be private and in cash. If you are
type 1 you will receive 5¤ additionally to compensate for your lower earning possibilities.
Program structure
You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test actions for you
and the four other players. Once you select an action for every player the computer will
calculate the payoﬀ you would obtain in this case.
In the upper right block you enter the action that will be relevant for your payoﬀ. Addi-
tionally in this block your type is displayed and whether you beneﬁt from the project. Below
there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your decision and leave the
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screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment continues. A clock on the
upper right hints at the time in which your decision should be made. If the time runs out
this has no eﬀect.
From period two on the actions of all players of all previous periods and your payoﬀ in
those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the ﬁrst period this block will be
empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
6.4 Instructions for CCM with incomplete information
Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read the instructions carefully. Do not talk to your
neighbor from now on. Shut down your mobile phone and keep it turned oﬀ until the
experiment ends. If you have any questions, raise your hands. We will come to you. All
participants have got the same instructions.
In the experiment you will be divided in groups of 5. The experiment will last for 20
periods. You will be grouped with the same four players in all periods. The experiment
is entirely anonymous. No player will be informed whom he was grouped up with or what
payoﬀ any other player obtains.
Points are the currency in the experiment. In every period you start with 10 points.
These points will by the end of the period either be added entirely to your private account,
or will be invested entirely into a common project.
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period every player will be assigned one type, which he will
keep for the entire game.
With a chance of 20% you are type 1 and you do not beneﬁt from the common project.
In this case in each period your 10 points will be added to your private account if you do
not invest them into the project. And 0 points will be added to your private account if you
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invest into the project. If any other players invest into the project does not inﬂuence your
payoﬀ in this case.
With a chance of 80% you are type 2 and you beneﬁt from the common project. In this
case in each period your 10 points will be added to your private account as well if you do not
invest them into the project, but 6 points will be added to your private account if you invest
into the project. Additionally you receive 6 points for every other player, who also invests
into the project.
The types are drawn independently, especially diﬀerent players may thus have diﬀerent
types. Every player gets displayed his type in every period. He does not get to know the
types of the other players.
Example 1: You are type 2 and you invest you 10 points into the project and 2 other
players invested into the project additionally. You will get for your investment and for the
investment of the other 2 players 6 points each. Thus you will get 3× 6 = 18 points in total
added to your account.
Example 2: You are type 2 and you do not invest your 10 points into the project and 2
players invested into the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and get additionally
6 points each for the investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get 10 + 2× 6 = 22 points
in total added to your account.
Example 3: You are type 1 and you do not invest your 10 points into the project and 2
players invested into the project in total. Your will keep your 10 points and get no additional
points for the investment of the other 2 players. Thus you get 10 points in total added to
your account.
Every player can choose in every period between six diﬀerent conditions:
• 0=Contribute in any case.
• 1=Contribute only if at least one other player contributes, too.
• 2=Contribute only if at least two other players contribute, too.
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• 3=Contribute only if at least three other players contribute, too.
• 4=Contribute only if all four other players contribute, too.
• 5=Contribute in no case.
The computer selects the highest amount of players, which can contribute to the project,
without violation the condition of any player. These players will then automatically con-
tribute to the project. The other players will not contribute.
Example 1: 3 players choose condition "1" and the other two players choose condition
"5". Then those 3 players, who chose condition "1" will contribute to the project.
Example 2: 3 players choose condition "3" and the other two players choose condition
"5". Then no player will contribute to the project.
Payoﬀ of all periods
After it was determined who contributes to the project in a given period, all players get
the corresponding points added to their account.
Then a new period starts. After 20 periods there will be a questionnaire. After the
experiment you will be called to receive your money. You will receive your earnings for all
periods at a rate of 40 points=1¤. The payment will be private and in cash. If you are
type 1 you will receive 5¤ additionally to compensate for your lower earning possibilities.
Program structure
You obtained a printed example for the structure of the program, which you will use to
submit your decision in every period. The screen is divided into three blocks.
The block on the upper left side contains a calculator. Here you can test conditions for
you and the four other players. Once you select a condition for every player the computer
will calculate the payoﬀ you would obtain in this case.
In the upper right block you enter the condition that will be relevant for your payoﬀ.
Additionally in this block your type is displayed and whether you beneﬁt from the project.
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Below there is a red button. When you push this button you submit your decision and leave
the screen. Only when all players pushed the button the experiment continues. A clock on
the upper right hints at the time in which your decision should be made. If the time runs
out this has no eﬀect.
From period two on the conditions of all players of all previous periods and your payoﬀ
in those periods will be displayed in the big block below. In the ﬁrst period this block will
be empty.
The texts in the green frames on the printed example of the program are comments that
explain the print. They will not be displayed in the actual program.
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Appendix B
In addition to instructions subjects had to ﬁll out a slide of comprehension questions. A
translation of the German original is given exemplary for the case of the CCM and incomplete
information:
Comprehension questions - Experiment PGCCM
You are asked to complete two test questions to check whether you understood the in-
structions completely.
Choose in the following test question 1 a condition for each player. Choose at least
three diﬀerent conditions:
Your condition (player 1):
Condition player 2:
Condition player 3:
Condition player 4:
Condition player 5:
Underline those players, who would contribute to the project in this case:
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
What payoﬀ would you obtain in this period if you are of type 2?
Choose also in the following test question 2 a condition for each player. Choose at least
three diﬀerent conditions, such that the number of players, who contribute to the project,
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diﬀers in test question 1 and 2:
Your condition (player 1):
Condition player 2:
Condition player 3:
Condition player 4:
Condition player 5:
Underline those players, who would contribute to the project in this case:
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
What payoﬀ would you obtain in this period if you are of type 1?
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